THIRD DIVISION
|
PNB
CREDIT CARD CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
- versus - MATILDE M. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 156336 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO
MORALES, J.:
Allegedly
failing to settle her account arising from her availment of her PNB Credit Card
to which she charged her purchases in the amount of P34,417.44 inclusive
of interest and penalty as of February 2, 1992, PNB Credit Card Corporation,
herein petitioner, filed a complaint[1] on
March 6, 1992 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati against Matilde
M. Rodriguez (Matilde), together with Lorenzo Y. Villalon (Villalon), her
co-obligor.
The
main issue in the present petition being whether the trial court’s first or
second order dismissing without prejudice petitioner’s complaint had
become final, a recital of the incidents in the case is in order.
Acting on the complaint, Branch 136
of the RTC of Makati issued summons to the
defendants Matilde and Villalon on
On
even date the summons was received for service by Genaro M. Adona (Adona), a process
server.[2]
More
than a year later or on March 26, 1993, Judge Francisco Donato Villanueva,
Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 136 of the Makati RTC, by Order of even date, dismissed
the complaint “for lack of interest to prosecute . .
. without prejudice.”[3] The records do not show that the defendants
were furnished copy of this order.
In
the meantime or on
Strangely,
however, before April 30, 1993, or on April 22, 1993, petitioner
filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration[5]
dated April 14, 1993 seeking the setting aside of the March 26, 1993 Order of
the trial court, alleging that upon verification, it found out that “the
summons was taken out or received by the process server of another branch of
the Regional Trial Court – Makati and up to the month of March, had not yet
filed his return”; and that upon further verification, its counsel learned that
“said process server had just filed his return on the
instant case . . .”[6] Parenthetically, no date was
stated by petitioner in its Motion for Reconsideration filed on April 22, 1993 when
it received the March 26, 1993 order which, if the handwritten
notation on the dorsal side of the original of the order[7] is
to be believed, was sent by registered mail on March 26, 1993 (a Friday). No copy of petitioner’s motion was
furnished Matilde.
Petitioner’s
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration[8]
dated
On
A day after the filing by petitioner of
the above-said Notice of Hearing, however, of its Motion for Reconsideration,
or on October 28, 1993, several days before the requested setting on
November 5, 1993, Presiding Judge Jose R. Bautista granted[12] petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration and ordered the case reinstated to the docket
of the court. In the same order, Judge
Bautista directed petitioner to show proof that the other defendant, Villalon,
was similarly served with summons and if not, to cause the service thereof upon
him with a copy of the complaint within ten days from receipt of the
order.
On petitioner’s motion, an “Alias” Summons[13]
dated
On
By
Order of
By
Order of February 22, 1995, the trial court, for the second time,
dismissed the case without prejudice “[f]or failure of
petitioner to comply with the [November 8, 1994] Order allowing it to present
evidence ex parte against Matilde, despite the lapse of an unreasonable
lenght [sic] of time.”[16]
On
1. The order of this Honorable Court dated
2. On the said date, or on
3. The instant case has not moved for sometime and was recently discovered in a peerless box after plaintiff made an inventory of all the cases it filed. This happened after plaintiff transferred its place of business from Makati to Pasay City on 11 May 1995.
4. Plaintiff is very much interested to prosecute the instant case but was precluded to do so in view of the foregoing reasons. It was only on 16 May 1995 that undersigned counsel was fully apprised of the status of this case.
5.
This motion is made in good faith (Emphasis and
underscoring in the original),
and praying that the Order of
February 22, 1995 be set aside and that it be allowed to present evidence ex
parte “on a date and time most convenient” to the court. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration contained
a Notice of Hearing[18]
addressed to the Clerk of Court requesting her “to submit the foregoing
motion for the consideration and approval of this Honorable Court immediately
upon receipt hereof” and that it had moved to its new address at “2/F Legal
Department, PNB Financial Center, PNB Complex, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City.”
Copy of the motion was furnished Matilde as well as Villalon.[19]
On
June 5, 1995, the trial court’s Officer-In-Charge motu propio issued
a notice advising that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration “is set for
hearing . . . on June 30, 1995 at 8:30 a.m.”[20]
To
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, Villalon filed on
By Order dated June 30, 1995,[23]
the trial court, finding that petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
“appear[ed] to be meritorious,” reconsidered its February 22, 1995 order
dismissing the case and gave petitioner ten days from [June 30, 1995] to
present its evidence ex parte failing
which it would dismiss the case with prejudice.
In the same order, the trial court designated the Officer-In-Charge as commissioner
for the purpose of receiving evidence ex
parte with the directive to submit his report within 20 days “from the date
of the submission of the case.”
On
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant Matilde M. Rodriguez, ordering the latter, as follows:
1.
To pay plaintiff the sum of P29,913.53, with
interest thereon at the rate of 2% per month and month penalty of 1%, both
commencing
2. To
pay the sum equivalent to 18% of the amount due for and as attorney’s fees;
3. To pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[25]
On
January 19, 1996, Matilde filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of
October 19, 1995 which she claimed to have received on January 5, 1996, alleging that 1)
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the first order of dismissal
failed to comply with Sections 4 to 6,
Rule 15 of the Rules, a) there being no proof of service of copy of
the motion to her and her co-defendant, Villalon, b) the motion was not set for
hearing on a specified date, and c) no actual hearing on the motion was
conducted; and 2) petitioner’s subsequent filing of a separate Notice of
Hearing on October 27, 1993 was “useless,” the 15-day period to assail the
first order of dismissal having expired, and the trial court’s granting of the
motion, without conducting a hearing thereon, was improper. Matilde thus concluded that the actions subsequent
to the finality of the first order of dismissal were void, citing Del
Castillo v. Aguinaldo.[26]
On
the trial court’s decision, Matilde opined that petitioner failed to prove its
case against her, citing her reasons therefor.
After the filing by petitioner of its
Opposition to Matilde’s Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s
decision, the latter’s Reply and Supplemental Reply, the trial court denied the
Motion in this wise:
The dismissal order on
The first Motion for Reconsideration of the order of dismissal was treated by the Court as Motion to Revive.
The second Motion for Reconsideration of the second order of dismissal of the case was seasonably filed by plaintiff. What defendant-movant should have done was to file an answer immediately after the second order of dismissal was set aside.
On the second assertion of defendant-movant in her Motion to set aside the Decision, suffice it to state that the same is supported by evidence of the plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendant-movant, thru counsel, is hereby denied for lack of merit.[27] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On appeal by Matilde, the appellate
court, by Decision of
As
noted elsewhere, in its Order dated
Undoubtedly, plaintiff-appellee’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the March 26, 1993 Order of dismissal which was only filed on April 22, 1993 was fatally flawed for the reason that the timeliness of its filing could not be ascertained inasmuch as the Motion did not state the date of receipt by movant of the Order sought to be reconsidered and for lack of the requisite notice of hearing. While plaintiff-appellee attempted to cure the latter defect by subsequently filing a separate Notice of Hearing for the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration, no hearing thereof was actually conducted by the lower court because nine (9) days before the supposed date of hearing of said motion or on October 28, 1993 to be precise, the lower court had already issued an Order granting plaintiff-appellee’s Motion for Reconsideration. The Court finds therefore that the Order of dismissal dated March 26, 1993 which was final in nature had already acquired final and executory character with the inevitable consequence that all subsequent proceedings taken by the court below like the October 23, 1993 Order which granted plaintiff-appellee’s urgent Motion for Reconsideration and reinstated the case, the November 8, 1994 Order which declared defendant-appellant in default, the ex-parte hearing conducted on July 10, 1995, and the insuing October 19, 1995 Decision which is the subject of the herein appeal, were all taken or issued by the court a quo without authority and are therefore NULL and VOID. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari[29] filed
by petitioner which argues that:
1.
Matilde’s
right to be heard had been waived by her inaction.
2.
Courts
will set aside technicalities and decide a case on the merits.
3.
The
order of dismissal without prejudice did not become final as it could be
“revived within a reasonable period of time,” citing Medrano & Associates
v. Roxas & Company[30] which
held:
Moreover,
even assuming said dismissal order had become final, the said dismissal was
without prejudice. Plaintiff can very
well refile the case. There is no reason
why instead of asking plaintiff to refile the case, the case can not be
reopened in the interest of justice.
It
is far better to dispose of a case on the merits rather than on a
technicality. That is the primordial end
of justice.
4.
The
trial court committed a mistake in dismissing the complaint.
5.
The
trial court may rectify its own mistake and reinstate the complaint citing Sec.
5(g), Rule 135.
6.
There
was no need to furnish copy of the Order dated October 28 (not 25), 1993 (granting
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the first order of dismissal without
prejudice) to Matilde as she had been priorly served with summons but she filed
no Answer and, in any event, she did not raise this matter in her Motion for
Reconsideration of the trial court’s Decision.
The petition must be denied for lack
of merit.
The Court of Appeals correctly found
that all proceedings taken after the issuance of the
That petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration may indeed have been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary
period gains credence with the declaration by the trial court that, as priorly
quoted, “the plaintiff can revive the case anytime, even after the lapse of
the 15-day reglementary period from receipt of the . . . order of
dismissal and that it (trial court) treated petitioner’s motion as a Motion
to Revive.”
The treatment by the trial court of
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as one for revival is of course
erroneous. For Bañares II v. Balising[31]
instructs:
This Court has previously held that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed.
In Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals, we stated, thus:
The dismissal without prejudice of a
complaint does not however mean that said dismissal order was any less
final. Such order of dismissal is
complete in all details, and though without prejudice, nonetheless finally
disposed of the matter. It was not
merely an interlocutory order but a final disposition of the complaint.
The
law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days from his receipt of
the court’s decision or order disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal
or move to reconsider the same.
After
the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and executory and
is beyond the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to
further amend or revoke. A final
judgment or order cannot be modified in any respect, even if the modification
sought is for the purpose of correcting an erroneous conclusion by the court
which rendered the same.
After
the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become final, and
therefore becomes outside the court’s power to amend and modify, a party who
wishes to reinstate the case has no other remedy but to file a new complaint. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied, citation omitted)
Rodriguez, Jr. v. Aguilar, Sr.[32] echoed the above-quoted ruling.
The facts and circumstances attendant
to Medrano[33]
cited by petitioner, wherein this Court held that even assuming that the
therein order of dismissal without prejudice had become final, “[t]here was no
reason why instead of asking plaintiff to refile the case, the case cannot be
reopened in the interest of justice,” are clearly different from those of the
present case. In Medrano, the
trial court, by Order of
Although the March 5, 1986 order of dismissal appears
to have become final as plaintiff failed to appeal therefrom or to file a
motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the reason plaintiff
failed to act accordingly appears to be that even before receipt of said
notice of the dismissal order he filed a motion to set the case for hearing. He was obviously awaiting action on the
same. Nevertheless, the trial court
reset the hearing of the case not once but three times. The only logical consequence of these actions
is that the trial court effectively reconsidered its order of dismissal
dated March 5.[34] (Underscoring supplied)
In other words, in Medrano,
this Court took into account the fact that, among other things, before the
plaintiff received a copy of the dismissal without prejudice order, it
filed before the trial court a motion to set the case for hearing, which the
trial court granted when it set the case for hearing three times, which action
of the trial court this Court took to logically mean that the order of
dismissal was “effectively reconsidered.”
In fine, the appellate
court’s nullification of the trial court’s October 28, 1994 Order granting
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the March 26, 1993 final and
executory order and of all proceedings taken thereafter is in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Records, pp. 1-4.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
.
[7] Ibid.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Ibid.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Ibid.
[20]
[21]
[22] Ibid.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] G.R. No. 57127,
[27] Records, p. 103.
[28] Penned by Justice Godardo
A. Jacinto, with the concurrence of Justices Martin S. Villarama
and Mario L. Guariña III, CA rollo, pp. 60-69.
[29] Rollo, pp. 19-32.
[30] G.R. No. 83346,
[31] 384 Phil. 567, 577-578 (2000).
[32] G.R. No. 159482,
[33] Supra note 30.
[34]